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CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS AND ABSTRACTS

same for both trials before the bar would be raised,
thereby adopting the more strict view of the
Spitzer case.
The conclusion that the Illinois court may accept
the view of the Spitzer case is supported by an
examination of Illinois law before the statute was
passed.40 It must be remembered that these cases
involved two prosecutions by Illinois, and were
decided under the constitutional prohibition and
not under a specific statute that required only the
same act to raise the bar. Nevertheless (prior to
passage of the statute), in single sovereignty
double jeopardy cases, the Illinois courts have
held that: "the fact that both crimes resulted
from the same transaction and involved the same
property...'[was] of no consequence. A conviction
or acquittal of burglary does not exempt the ac40 People v. Woolsey, 399 Ill.
617, 78 N.E.2d 237
(1948). The Illinois court held burglary and robbery
to be separate offenses even though the charges arose
from the same act. People v. Flaherty, 396 II1. 304,
71 N.E.2d 779 (1947); the defendant, after being
acquitted in one trial of a burglary and a larceny
charge, was brought to trial a second time and convicted on a charge of robbery growing out of the same
facts. These cases are single sovereignty cases, but they
indicate the direction of the Illinois courts' decisions
in the past. See, People v. Barktus, note 21 supra.

[Vol. 51

cused from prosecution and punishment for robbery." Because of these views, it is likely that
similar results will be reached in dual sovereignty
double jeopardy cases under the new statute.
One of the best arguments against the obvious
flaunting of the spirit of the double jeopardy
statute, as could occur in Illinois, was stated by a
New York court in People v. Savarese.4 There it
was pointed out that the bar against double
jeopardy raised by the state constitution was a
narrow bar that would be lowered by the addition
of one necessary fact to the indictment, but the
statutory bar should be used as the legislature intended, as a supplement to the constitutional bar, rising to protect the accused when it becomes necessary to use one essential fact in both
trials. This interpretation, if accepted by the Illinois court, besides carrying out the presumed intent of the legislature, would allow the courts to
erect a reasonably dear set of standards and aid in
bringing about some degree of consistency in the
law.
41People v. Flaherty, note 40 supra, at 311.
42 1 Misc. 2d 305, 114 N.Y.S.2d 8146 (Kings County
Court 1951). This was a case involving a determination
of the legislative intent with regard to the double
punishment statutes of New York.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
One Need Not Allege Possession or Ownership
of Contraband To Suppress Its Use in EvidencePetitioner was convicted of possession of narcotic
drugs. The federal district court ruled that he did
not have standing to move to suppress evidence
-seized pursuant to an allegedly unlawful search
since he alleged neither ownership nor possession
of the narcotics seized. The search took place in
the apartment of a friend whom the petitioner was
visiting. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the
ground that the search and seizure were valid and
thus did not pass on the question of petitioner's
standing to move to suppress. On certiorari, the
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding
that petitioner had standing to contend that the
entry and subsequent seizure were unlawful,
despite the fact that petitioner had testified that
neither the property seized nor the place of arrest
were his. To rule otherwise, the Court insisted,
would be to permit the government to take advantage of contradictory positions as the basis for
the conviction. The conviction flowed from

petitioner's possession of narcotics at the time of
the search, yet fruits of the search were admitted
into evidence against him on the ground that he
did not have ownership or possession of narcotics
at that time. Since petitioner was present in the
apartment with the permission of the owner at the
time the narcotics were seized, he had sufficient
interest in the premises to be a "person aggrieved"
by the search under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 41 (e). Jones v. United States, 28 U.S.L.
WEEK 4235, (U.S. March 28, 1960).

Consolidation of Causes for Trial Denies Due
Process When Attorney for Both Defendants Can
Make No Decision of Consequence Without
Harming One Defendant or the Other-Petitioner
and a co-defendant were convicted of assault and
grand larceny. The defendants were tried together
and were defended by the same attorney. Petitioner
maintained his innocence throughout the trial and
claimed that his co-defendant stood ready to
testify that he was not a party to the commission
of either offense. Counsel was faced with the
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dilemma of deciding whether the co-defendant
should testify, thus exonerating petitioner and
convicting himself or should remain silent and
thereby not prejudice his own cause. He advised
the co-defendant to remain silent. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed, holding
that the consolidation for a single trial of the
informations charging distinct crimes, in face of
existing conflicting interests, constituted a denial
to the petitioner of due process and right to counsel.
State v. Martineau, 101 N.W.2d 410 (Minn. 1960).
In Order To Constitute Second Offense, Both
Crimes *Must Be Against Same Soverign-Petitioner was convicted of murder in the second
degree and sentenced to life imprisonment in
Pennsylvania. A previous conviction of a similar
offense in New York was considered in determining
that the increased penalty for second or subsequent
offenses was appropriate. On a writ of habeas
corpus, petitioner challenged the legality of the
application of the increased sentence based on the
out-of-state conviction. The Supreme Cou'rt of
Pennsylvania granted the writ and remanded the
cause for imposition of a proper and legal sentence.
The court held that there was no suggestion in the
Pennsylvania enabling statute which would allow
convictions in other states to be considered in the
computation of sentence for crimes committed
within the Commonwealth. Swingle v. Banmiller,
156 A.2d 520 (Pa. 1959).
Bail Pending Appeal Must Ordinarily Be
Granted in Federal Criminal Prosecutions-Petitioner was convicted of knowingly making false
statements to a federal savings and loan association
in order to obtain a loan to which he was not
entitled. He was denied bail by the district court,
pending appeal. Petitioner contended that he was
entitled to bail as a matter of right under Rule 46
(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit granted his application for bail, holding
that none of the grounds for denying bail were
present. It noted that bail can be denied only (1)
where the appeal is insubstantial or frivolous, (2)
where there is a real danger of the defendant
fleeing, (3) where defendant has committed prior
offenses, or (4) where there is a reasonable likelihood that the defendant will commit additional
offenses if released on bail. Rhodes v. United States,
275 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1960).
Communication to Jury of Trial Judge's Opinion
on Question of Guilt Constitutes Prejudicial

Error-Petitioner was charged with armed
robbery. The jury found it difficult to reach a
verdict and requested the judge to redefine the
term "armed robbery." In response the trial judge
stated: "Now, again, I am not telling you what I
believe in this matter; the evidence indicates that
the two other men were armed but strongly indicates that he (the defendant) was not armed ... the
only evidence I recollect is that he may have at
some time or other made some request to get the
gun from the other men who had it. That is all
there is so while he was armed in the sense of being
armed, he was not personally armed and if you
came out with a verdict otherwise, why I would
change it because I would have to." The defense
promptly objected to these remarks as prejudicial.
The defendant was convicted and the California
District Court of Appeal, Second District, reversed
the conviction. It held that the remarks of the
trial judge indicated a personal belief in the guilt of
the defendant and suggested that he might find a
way to extend leniency to the defendant if he were
found guilty. People v. Muza, 3 Cal. Rep. 395 (Cal.
2d Dist. 1960).
Character of a Defendant Is Put in Issue Only
When He Calls Witnesses To Attest to His
Reputation-Petitioner was convicted of dispensing and distributing four capsules of heroin.
In response to a question by the prosecution, he
testified that he had not obtained narcotic drugs
for his co-defendants on any occasion other than
that specified in the indictment. The testimony of
one of the co-defendants regarding other alleged
narcotic transactions was admitted in evidence
over petitioner's objection. The Court of Appeals
for- the Second Circuit reversed the conviction,
holding that it was prejudicial error for the court
to admit this rebuttal testimony since it went far
beyond the permissible bounds of attacking a
witness's credibility. The court stated: "When a
witness is cross-examined for the purpose -of
destroying his credibility by proof of specific acts
of misconduct not the subject of a conviction, the
examiner must be content with the answer. The
examiner may not, over objection, produce independent proof to show the falsity of such answer."
Since the defendant had not put his character in
issue, no independent evidence could be admitted
in rebuttal on this issue. United States v. Masino,
275 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1960).
Court of Appeals Has No Power to Revise a

